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IN THE SUPRE!1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTE CAL LAND DEVELOP!1ENT 
CORPORATION, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, Case No. 16017 
ROBERT R. SATHER and 
BONNIE LEE SATHER, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS' REPLY 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
APPEAL FR0!1 JUDG!1ENT ON THE VERDICT OF 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE 
STATE!1ENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the ownership of and the respective 
interests of the parties in and to real property situate in 
Uintah County, State of Utah. Plaintiff claims damages from 
defendants for taking possession of said property, and defendants 
SATHER claim reimbursement from the plaintiff for money with 
interest thereon advanced for plaintiff's benefit by defendants 
SATHER in connection with said land. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury upon special interroga-
tories. The jury found that plaintiff was the owner of the 
real property and was entitled to possession thereof upon its 
paying to the defendants SATHER the sum of $21,500.00. The 
jury further found that defendant ROBERT R. SATHER acted 
"wilfully and maliciously" toward the plaintiff in taking 
possession of said property, but awarded no damages to the 
plaintiff as a consequence thereof. The trial court, upon 
motion of the defendants after the jury had been discharged, 
declined to allow defendants interest on the money found by the 
jury to be due from the plaintiff to the defendants, and the 
trial court declined to grant the plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial on the issue of damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the jury finding that 
defendant ROBERT R. SATHER was guilty of "wilful and malicious" 
conduct toward the plaintiff; defendants seek a determination 
that the plaintiff owes defendants the sum of $46,560.00 for 
money advanced for plaintiff's benefit by the defendants; and 
defendants seek a further determination that defendants are 
entitled to interest on the sums owing from plaintiff to the 
defendants. Defendants, in the alternative, seek a new trial 
on such issues. Defendants further seek affirmation of the 
trial court's ruling denying the plaintiff's motion for a new 
-2-
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trial on the issue of damages as raised by plaintiff's cross-
appeal in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants refer to and adopt the Statement of Facts 
heretofore set forth in appellants' initial Brief on appeal. 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT 
DEFENDANTS SATHER WERE ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE Sill1 OF $46,560.00, 
PLUS INTEREST, BY PLAINTIFF RATHER THAN ONLY THE SUH OF 
$21,500.00. 
Defendants reaffirm their position with respect to 
the above point as set forth in appellants' original Brief, 
Point II therein, and in addition thereto respectfully direct 
the Court's attention to additional parts of the record which 
are supplementary thereto, and which demonstrate that the 
receipt of $25,000.00 by defendants SATHER from the proceeds 
of the $50,000.00 loan from the bank to the plaintiff, was not 
itself a loan from the plaintiff to the defendants SATHER. As 
testified by defendants SATHER, the $25,000.00 was received by 
the defendants SATHER as a payment to them on a pre-existing 
debt of Pete Buffo, president of plaintiff (TR-258), and Buffo 
was given credit against his debt to defendants SATHER in such 
amount (TR-258,269). 
The defendants SATHER, as guarantors of plaintiff's 
past due obligation to the bank, actually paid $46,560.00 of 
-3-
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their own money to discharge plaintiff's debt to the bank, and 
thus should be entitled to reimbursement from plaintiff in such 
amount, plus interest, from the date of payment in March, 1974. 
This is particularly so because of plaintiff's recognition of 
the obligation as outlined in Pete Buffo's letter to defendant 
SATHER dated September 25, 1974 (EX 71-D). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS SATHER HAVE NOT WAIVED THE RIGHT TO HAVE 
THE COURT CONSIDER ADDING INTEREST. 
Defendants SATHER concede that failure to object to 
an insufficient or informal verdict before the jury is dismissed 
constitutes a waiver of such deficiency. (Langden vs. Inter-
national Transport Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P. 2d 1211). 
However, the jury verdict with respect to the award made in 
favor of the defendants SATHER was not "insufficient" within 
the meaning of that word as used in Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (See Jorgensen vs. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 
383 P.2d 934). The jury was asked if the plaintiff was obligated 
to pay any sum to the defendants SATHER, and if so, what amount. 
The jury answered in the affirmative and indicated an amount of 
$21,500.00. (Special Interrogatories 14 and 15, R-601). The 
verdict as thus returned on this point was regular on its face 
and was not any indication that defendants SATHER should be 
deprived of interest on said amount. The only figures before 
the jury relative to such point showed that the defendants SATHER 
paid the sum of $46,560.00 to the bank under their guarantee of 
-4-
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plaintiff's loan (EX 49-P), and that defendants SATHER in order 
to assist in raising the money, cashed in Savings Certificate 
No. 19479 in the amount of $25,000.00 (TR-261), which certifi-
cate was purchased with money obtained by defendants SATHER from 
the plaintiff from plaintiff's $50,000.00 bank loan. The said 
$25,000.00 sum was received by SATHER as payment on account 
for money owed by Pete Buffo, president of plaintiff, to 
defendants SATHER (TR-258). This obligation to SATHER was 
acknowledged by Pete Buffo in his letter to defendant SATHER 
dated September 25, 1974. (EX 71-D). It thus appears rather 
obvious that the jury in arriving at the amount of their award 
to the defendants SATHER, deducted (mistakenly and erroneously 
as pointed out in defendants SATHER'S argument in Point I above 
and in the argument on Point II set forth in defendants' initial 
Brief herein to which reference is hereby made), the said sum 
of $25,000.00 from the amount defendants SATHER paid to the 
bank to retire plaintiff's over-due note which had been guaranteed 
by defendants SATHER. 
Since interest could be awarded to the defendants on 
such sum as a matter of law by the Court, there was no reason 
or obligation for defendants SATHER to pursue the matter 
further with the jury. (See Argument of Point III beginning 
on page 18 of defendants' original appellants' Brief on file 
in this matter). 
The situation with respect to defendants SATHER'S 
claim for interest is distinguishable from plaintiff's motion 
-5-
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for a new trial on the issue of damages. The verdict returned 
by the jury with respect to plaintiff's claim for damages was 
at variance with their finding of fault on the part of defendants 
SATHER, and thus plaintiff should be held to have waived any 
right to a new trial on the issue of damages because of the 
failure to have the matter clarified by the jury before the 
jury was dismissed. (See defendants' Argument of Point III 
below to which reference is hereby made). 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE 
OF DAMAGES AS CLAIMED IN PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL. 
The jury found that plaintiff had not been damaged 
by any actions of the defendants. To Special Interrogatory 
No. 4 which reads as follows: 
"After subtracting any monies due Mr. Sather from 
Ute Cal Land Development Corporation, what money 
damages, if any, did Ute Cal Land Development 
Corporation sustain as a direct result of the 
delivery of the warranty deed to Mr. Sather", 
the jury answered, "None", (R-599). 
The foregoing responses were made by the jury even 
though they found that the agreement between defendants SATHER 
and the plaintiff (EX 3-P), which permitted defendants SATHER 
to claim the deed to the property in question in the event 
defendants SATHER should pay off plaintiff's $50,000.00 loan 
to the bank, had been cancelled (Special Interrogatories l and 
2, R-598), and even though the jury also found that the 
defendants SATHER had acted wilfully and maliciously toward 
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the plaintiff in obtaining the said deed from the bank (EX 32-P; 
Special Interrogatory No. 10, R-600). 
In answer to Special Interrogatory No. 11 which reads 
as follows: 
"If your answer to No. 10 is yes, what amount of 
punitive damages do you assess to the defendant 
only?" 
the jury answered, "None" (R-600). 
The plaintiff, at the time the verdict was returned 
and before the jury was dismissed, did not ask the Court to 
have the jury consider the damage issue further, although there 
was ample opportunity to do so and although there was consider-
able discussion of the matter between Court and counsel (TR 323-
326). The plaintiff has thus waived any right to have the 
issue of damages considered on appeal. 
If, as the jury found, the defendants SATHER had no 
right to gain possession of the deed from the bank and to take 
possession of the property in question as they did, then the 
plaintiff should have been entitled to some compensation, even 
though nominal. The verdict was thus insufficient on its face 
as to that point and the plaintiff should have requested the 
Court to direct the jury to consider the matter further (Rule 
47(r) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
Plaintiff would have the Court adopt a determination 
that the verdict was regular on its face in this respect, but 
only lacking in amount. Such is not the meaning of "insufficient" 
as used in Rule 47(r). For the purposes of that rule, the word 
-7-
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"insufficient" means inadequate or lacking in some purpose or 
use. (Jorgensen vs. Gonzales, supra). The Jorgensen case was 
cited with approval by this Court in Langton vs. International 
Transport Inc., supra, and wherein the following language was 
quoted, to-wit: 
"The general and well established rule is that 
so long as the jury is functioning as such in 
the course of the trial and until it is dis-
charged, it is subject to directions and instruc-
tions from the court to the end that the issues 
be fully tried, deliberated upon and a correct 
verdict rendered. And where it is apparent 
that there is some patent error in connection 
with the verdict, the court may, of course, call 
the matter to their attention and direct them 
to deliberate." 
The plaintiff in the Langton case (supra) was in the 
same position as the plaintiff in this case, having failed to 
request the Court to re-submit the matter to the jury on the 
issue of damages, and wherein this Court approved the following 
language: 
"He are satisfied that when the plaintiff, after 
acquainting himself with the verdict, made no 
objections to its receipt and no motion that the 
cause be re-committed to the jury, he waived the 
objection now under analysis. Having waived them, 
they were unavailable as the basis for a motion 
for a new trial. The motion should, therefore, 
have been denied". 
As further stated in Langton vs. International 
Transport Inc., supra: 
"There is a basic distinction between an insuffi-
cient or informal verdict and a verdict regular 
on its face, which mvards inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. In the latter case, a 
new trial must be granted to correct the error. 
-8-
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In the former case, counsel has an opportunity to 
assert an objection, and the court, under Rule 47(r) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may return the Jury 
for further del~beration and with further instruc-
tions to correct the irregularity. If counsel does 
not avail himself of this opportunity, his objection 
to the irregularity of the verdict is waived". 
In the case of Cohn vs. J. C. Penney Company, 537 P.2d 
306, the jury found for the plaintiff on the issue of liability 
but failed to award any general damages. This Court held in 
that case that: 
"In the instant matter there was not merely an 
inadequate award of general damages, there was no 
award at all. The verdict was deficient in form, 
and counsel had an opportunity to have the jury 
sent back for further deliberations. This he did 
not do, perhaps fearing that the jury might either 
award some nominal amount or even change the 
verdict and award nothing to the plaintiff. It 
would be a smart trial tactic if he could have 
had a new trial on damages only before a jury 
which would not be acquainted with the weakness 
of plaintiff's cause of action". 
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial on the issue of damages (R 670-671), and such a determin-
ation is within the discretion of the trial court (58 Am. Jur. 
2d 209). The determination of the trial court on that matter 
should not be reversed where there is not an abuse of that 
discretion. No abuse of discretion on that point is evident in 
this case. (Uptown Appliance and Radio Company vs. Flint, 122 
Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants SATHER refer to their initial appellants' 
Brief herein and adopt the Conclusions therein stated. It is 
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further respectfully submitted that plaintiff has waived any 
right to a new trial on the issue of damages by reason of the 
failure to raise that matter before the jury was dismissed. 
In any event, should a new trial be ordered in this matter, 
such new trial should be on all issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF ~~ILING 
Two copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Deland & McRae, attorneys for plaintiff, respondent 
and cross-app~ll~nt, 317 West 1st South Street, Vernal, Utah 
84078, this~~ day of May, 1979. 
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